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Carlo Patent sat at the far end of a mahogany table and patiently 
waited for the licensing negotiations to begin.  The thumping was weak 
at first, but now there was no denying its presence.  Through the rattling 
of his water cup and the sway of the lights above, Carlo felt as if the 
whole foundation of his company was shaking in protest.  Then, without 
further warning, the door to the conference room burst open and a 
hunched over Eli Widget hastily entered riding on top of his half-ton 
pink elephant.  Carlo ignored the elephant, introduced himself to Eli, and 
began his presentation.  Within seconds Carlo was cut off by Eli’s demand, 
“Listen, do I infringe your patent or not?”  “Well, sir,” replied Carlo, “that’s 
what I am here to discuss and find out.”  The elephant shifted uneasily and 
slowly advanced towards Carlo.  “I don’t think you answered my question.  
Do I or do I not infringe your patent?”  By now the elephant’s trunk was 
inches from Carlo’s face and he could no longer maintain his carefree 
composure.  “Alright, yes, I think you may infringe my patent, but I 
want to work out a licensing deal with you, or if it is possible, maybe 
you could show me how your product does not infringe my patent.”  But 
it was too late.  As Eli smugly turned and began his exit, he muttered 
over his shoulder, “Thank you very much Carlo; we’ll see you in court.”  
Three days later, Carlo was served with a lawsuit seeking to declare his 
patent invalid, and to further declare that, even if the patent is valid, Eli 
does not infringe. 
This scene dramatizes the problem feared in boardrooms today: Even 
a good faith attempt to negotiate a license could expose a patent holder 
to a declaratory judgment challenge against the validity of the parent 
holder’s patents.  A declaratory judgment is a procedural device that 
allows for a judicial determination of rights and legal relations between 
two adverse parties.1 In the patent context, declaratory judgment jurisdiction 
balances the interests of the patent holder and the potential patent infringer.  
Too much declaratory judgment jurisdiction would allow a potential 
patent infringer to challenge a patent holder’s patents for no legitimate 
reason, unfairly subjecting the patent holder to excessive litigation.  
However, too little jurisdiction would allow a patent holder to prey upon a 
potential infringer’s uncertainty about whether or not the potential 
infringer really does infringe a valid patent, and coerce outrageous licenses.  
This Comment explores how the Supreme Court’s decision in MedImmune, 
Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,2 and the subsequent Federal Circuit’s decision in 
SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc.,3 both contribute to an 
overexpansion of declaratory judgment jurisdiction. 
 1. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Wycoff Co., Inc., 344 U.S. 237, 241 (1952). 
 2. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007). 
 3. SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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The Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934 provides jurisdiction to 
potential patent infringers who seek judicial resolution regarding the 
question of whether or not they infringed a patent.4  The MedImmune 
and SanDisk decisions unnecessarily expand this jurisdiction too far in 
favor of the potential patent infringer.5  This overexpansion of 
declaratory judgment jurisdiction threatens to chill licensing negotiations 
and conflicts with the policy justifications rooted in the Declaratory 
Judgment Act of 1934. 
Part I of this Comment will analyze the background behind the creation 
of declaratory judgment jurisdiction, beginning with the Declaratory 
Judgment Act of 1934.6  Part II will explain the significant relation 
between declaratory judgments and patent infringement, focusing on the 
recent development of the MedImmune and SanDisk decisions.  Part III 
will then explore three potentially negative implications of the Federal 
Circuit’s SanDisk decision.  Part IV argues that in light of recent cases, 
the expansion of declaratory judgment jurisdiction in MedImmune and 
SanDisk is not convincingly supported by the policy underlying patent 
declaratory judgment law.  As a result, Part V recommends a new 
declaratory judgment jurisdiction test, to better balance the rights of 
potential infringers and patent holders, by encouraging district court 
judges to use discretion to decline declaratory judgment jurisdiction. 
I. THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT
Prior to the Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, parties could not 
secure the determination of legally enforceable rights against another 
party without first having a valid cause of action under which to sue that 
other party.7  This stranded potential patent infringers with no way to 
definitively resolve their uncertainty about the validity and scope of 
patents that questionably related to their business, until the patent holder 
 4. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2000). 
5. See SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1385 (Bryson, J., concurring). 
 6. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2000). 
7. See Legislation Recommended by the American Bar Association: Hearing on 
H.R. 5030, H.R. 10141, H.R. 10142, and H.R. 10143 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
67th Cong. 16 (1922) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Rep. Sumners) (noting that 
the purpose of the declaratory judgment statute is “[t]o remove uncertainty” and that “the 
individual citizen has as much right to be reasonably certain as to what the courts would 
determine his rights to be as he has to be reasonably certain what the legislature has 
determined his rights to be”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2000). 
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filed an infringement suit.8 Additionally, patentees would utilize the 
potential patent infringer’s uncertainty to elicit unfair and advantageous 
licensing agreements.9  In Arrowhead Industrial Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, 
Inc., the court described the situation the Declaratory Judgment Act 
sought to resolve: 
[A] patent owner engages in a danse macabre, brandishing a Damoclean threat 
with a sheathed sword. . . .  Guerilla-like, the patent owner attempts extra-
judicial patent enforcement with scare-the-customer-and-run tactics that infect 
the competitive environment of the business community with uncertainty and 
insecurity. . . .  [C]ompetitors victimized by that tactic were rendered helpless 
and immobile so long as the patent owner refused to grasp the nettle and sue.10
However, by enacting the Declaratory Judgment Act, Congress intended 
for any party to have access to the courts to declare their rights and other 
legal relations as long as an actual controversy existed between the 
parties.11  Competitors were no longer restricted to an “in terrorem
choice between the incurrence of a growing potential liability for patent 
infringement and abandonment of their enterprises; they could clear the 
air by suing for a judgment that would settle the conflict of interests.”12
The phrase actual controversy within the Declaratory Judgment Act 
refers to the type of cases and controversies that are justiciable under 
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.13  The Supreme Court has 
8. Hearings on H.R. 5623 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 70th Cong. 35 
(1928) (statement of E.R. Sunderland, Professor).  Professor Sunderland explains the 
alleged patent infringer’s entangled situation as: 
I assert that I have a right to use a certain patent.  You claim that you have a 
patent.  What am I going to do about it?  There is no way I can litigate my 
right, which I claim, to use that device, except by going ahead and using it, and 
you [the patent holder] can sit back as long as you please and let me run up just 
as high a bill of damages as you wish to have me run up, and then you may sue 
me for damages, and I am ruined, having acted all the time in good faith and 
on my best judgment, but having no way in the world to find out whether I had 
a right to use that device or not. 
Id.
9. See, e.g., Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 735 
(Fed. Cir. 1988). 
10. Id. at 734–35. 
 11. “In promulgating the Declaratory Judgment Act, Congress intended to prevent 
avoidable damages from being incurred by a person uncertain of his rights and 
threatened with damage by delayed adjudication.”  Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Norton 
Co., 929 F.2d 670, 673 (Fed Cir. 1991).  “In a case of actual controversy within its 
jurisdiction . . . any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, 
may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such 
declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) 
(2000).
12. Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 735. 
 13. U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.  This Clause states: 
The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under 
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which 
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interpreted an appropriate justiciable controversy as one distinguishable 
from a hypothetical, abstract, academic, or moot dispute.14  For a court 
to have jurisdiction over a controversy, “the controversy must be definite 
and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal 
interests.”15
II. JURISDICTIONAL THRESHOLD FOR DECLARATORY                           
JUDGMENTS IN PATENT ACTIONS
Courts have struggled to determine an appropriate standard for determining 
when a controversy is sufficiently “definite and concrete, touching the 
legal relations of parties.”16  The Supreme Court has determined that the 
Declaratory Judgment Act’s justiciability principles are the nature and 
controversy of the case as determined through “the relation and interests 
of the parties, and the relief sought in the instant case.”17  The Court 
analyzes justiciability in this context by examining standing and ripeness.18
The plaintiff has standing if they are threatened with imminent injury-in-
fact, fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant.19
Ripeness requires the parties to suffer a sufficient hardship that can be 
redressed through the court’s consideration.20  However, standing and 
ripeness are amorphous concepts that defy bright-line applications, so 
courts have struggled to define a consistent justiciability threshold for 
declaratory judgment jurisdiction.21  This is troublesome for both patent 
shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, 
other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime 
Jurisdiction; to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to 
Controversies between two or more States; between a State and Citizens of 
another State; between Citizens of different States,—between Citizens of the 
same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or 
the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. 
Id.; MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 126 (2007); Aetna Life Ins. Co. 
v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239–40 (1937). 
14. Aetna, 300 U.S. at 240. 
15. Id. at 240–41.  See also Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359, 371 (1943) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
16. Aetna, 300 U.S. at 240. 
17. Id. at 241. 
 18. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 128 n.8 (2007). 
19. Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). 
 20. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148–49 (1967). 
 21. “Previously, the Court held that ‘the difference between an abstract question 
and a “controversy” contemplated by the Declaratory Judgment Act is necessarily one of 
degree, and it would be difficult, if it would be possible, to fashion a precise test for 
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holders and potential patent infringers, because there is no easy definition of 
safe licensing communication, free of the threat of declaratory judgment 
jurisdiction.
Prior to 2007, the Federal Circuit articulated a two-part “reasonable 
apprehension of suit” test to determine when declaratory judgment 
jurisdiction was proper in patent cases.22  First, the court considered 
whether the patentee’s conduct created reasonable apprehension on the 
part of the declaratory judgment plaintiff.23  Second, the court examined 
whether the declaratory judgment plaintiff’s current or future conduct 
would amount to infringing activity.24  Although the Federal Circuit’s 
reasonable apprehension of suit test was used to guide parties as to the 
Constitution’s Article III justiciability limit, the test was actually more 
restrictive of declaratory judgment jurisdiction than the full extent 
potentially allowable under the Constitution.25  By limiting declaratory 
judgment jurisdiction to something less than the constitutional maximum, 
the Federal Circuit was trying to protect “quiescent patent owners against 
unwarranted litigation.”26  The policy behind this promoted negotiation over 
litigation, and set a standard that patent holders could follow to prevent 
litigation.27
determining in every case whether there is such a controversy.’”  Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. 
v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting Md. Cas. Co. v. 
Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)).  See also Sony Elecs., Inc. v. 
Guardian Media Techs., Ltd., 497 F.3d 1271, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (stating that the 
Supreme Court has not articulated a bright-line rule for distinguishing those cases that 
satisfy the actual controversy requirement from those that do not). 
 22. Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 736 (Fed. Cir. 
1988).
 23. SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 
2007).
24. Id. (citing Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 736).  The court did not decide the merits of 
whether the declaratory judgment plaintiff’s conduct infringes on the patent holder’s 
patent.  But if the declaratory judgment plaintiff’s activity does infringe the declaratory 
judgment defendant’s patent, then the court will be more inclined to grant a declaratory 
judgment.  Conversely, if the declaratory judgment plaintiff’s action does not infringe 
the defendant’s patent, then no controversy exists and the court will decline declaratory 
judgment jurisdiction.  SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1379. 
 25. In Teva Pharmaceuticals, Judge Gajarsa argued in his dissent: 
[The court] claims that a reasonable apprehension of suit is required to meet 
Article III’s case or controversy requirement.  But this is not the only way to 
establish the existence of a case for purposes of Article III.  The reasonable 
apprehension of suit doctrine exists to cabin declaratory judgment actions 
where the only controversy surrounds a potential, future lawsuit. 
Teva, 405 F.3d at 997 (Gajarsa, J., dissenting). 
26. Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 736. 
 27. “This court held that where all that is present is negotiation unaccompanied by 
threats of legal action, the setting is not sufficiently adverse to create a justiciable 
controversy.”  EMC Corp. v. Norand Corp., 89 F.3d 807, 812 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
HALSEY.UPDATEDPRINTER 3/12/2009 10:13:30 AM
[VOL. 46:  247, 2009] Declaratory Judgment 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
 253
In the 2007 Supreme Court case, MedImmune, Inc. v. Genetech, Inc.,
the Court reexamined Article III’s case or controversy requirement in 
relation to the Declaratory Judgment Act.28  In this opinion, the majority 
rejected the first prong of the Federal Circuit’s reasonable apprehension 
of suit test on the grounds that it conflicted with several prior Supreme 
Court decisions.29  In its place, the Court restored a broader declaratory 
judgment standard to make jurisdiction coextensive with the maximum 
case and controversy limit of the Constitution.30  According to the Court, 
the necessary inquiry is “whether the facts alleged, under all the 
circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between 
parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality 
to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.”31  The Federal 
Circuit coined this analysis the “all circumstances” test.32  Two months 
after MedImmune, in SanDisk v. STMicroelectronics, the Federal Circuit 
followed the Supreme Court’s direction to abolish the reasonable 
apprehension of suit test and replaced it with the all circumstances test.33
28. SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1378. 
 29. CAT Tech L.L.C. v. Tubemaster, Inc., 528 F.3d 871, 879 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  
The Court in MedImmune found that the first prong of the reasonable apprehension of 
suit test conflicted with Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 
273 (1941), and Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239 (1937).  
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 132 n.11 (2007).  Additionally, the 
Court found the test to be in tension with Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc.,
508 U.S. 83, 98 (1993).  MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 132 n.11. 
30. MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 127.  According to the Supreme Court, a case or 
controversy requires: 
[T]hat the dispute be “definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of the 
parties having adverse legal interests”; and that it be “real and substantial” and 
“admi[t] of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as 
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a 
hypothetical state of facts.” 
Id. (quoting Aetna, 300 U.S. at 240–41). 
31. MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 127. 
32. See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1345–46 
(Fed. Cir. 2007).
33. See SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1379, 1381, 1383. Recently, the Federal Circuit has 
explored the role that the still existing second prong of the reasonable apprehension of 
suit test can play in determining the totality of the circumstances.  CAT Tech, 528 F.3d at 
880.  The second prong of the reasonable apprehension of suit test focuses upon the 
declaratory judgment plaintiff’s conduct and examines whether there has been meaningful 
preparation for potentially infringing activity.  Id.  The Federal Circuit flexed the power 
of this analysis by boldly stating that “[i]f a declaratory judgment plaintiff has not taken 
significant, concrete steps to conduct infringing activity, the dispute is neither ‘immediate’ nor 
‘real’ and the requirements for justiciability have not been met.”  Id.
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In SanDisk, the Federal Circuit held that Article III jurisdiction for a 
patent declaratory judgment action may exist where patent holders 
believe that they have patent rights which may prohibit another party’s 
ongoing or planned activities, and where that other party contends that it 
has the right to engage in the activities without a license.34  The patent 
holder in SanDisk approached a potential licensee requesting a cross-
licensing agreement.35  The patent holder, STMicroelectronics, offered a 
detailed presentation that identified the manner in which SanDisk infringed 
specific patent claims.36  However, the patent holder further told the 
potential licensee that it had “absolutely no plan whatsoever to sue 
SanDisk.”37  Following this incident, SanDisk sought, as plaintiff, a declaratory 
judgment of noninfringement and invalidity of the fourteen STMicroelectronics 
patents that had been discussed during the cross-licensing negotiations.38
Overturning the district court’s grant of STMicroelectronics’ motion to 
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit 
held that SanDisk met Article III’s jurisdictional requirements because 
STMicroelectronics put SanDisk in a position of either pursuing 
arguably illegal behavior, or abandoning what it asserted were rightful 
activities.39  The Federal Circuit’s SanDisk interpretation of the Supreme 
Court’s MedImmune standard represents a significant departure from 
prior Federal Circuit decisions on patent declaratory judgment jurisdiction, 
and raises new questions related to interpreting Article III jurisdiction 
under the Declaratory Judgment Act discussed in the following sections 
of this Comment. 
III. THREE POTENTIALLY NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF SANDISK
Three repercussions of the SanDisk decision are examined below: 
First, SanDisk significantly broadens declaratory judgment jurisdiction; 
second, SanDisk narrows effective use of covenants not to sue; and third, 
SanDisk limits the district court’s discretion to deny an otherwise 
allowable declaratory judgment suit.  As a result, this Comment will 
show that the Federal Circuit’s broad declaratory judgment jurisdiction 
interpretation in SanDisk threatens to chill licensing negotiations by 
unfairly increasing the leverage of potential patent infringers during licensing 
negotiation, limiting the ability of the parties to negotiate around declaratory 
34. SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1381. 
35. Id. at 1374. 
36. Id. at 1375. 
37. Id. at 1376. 
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1381. 
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judgment suits, and preventing district judges from using their discretion 
to level the playing field during negotiations. 
A. SanDisk Overbroadens Declaratory Judgment Jurisdiction 
The SanDisk decision fortified the interpretation replacing the reasonable 
apprehension of suit test with the more expansive all circumstances test 
proposed in MedImmune and adopted from Maryland Casualty Co. v. 
Pacific Coal & Oil Co.40  Under the all circumstances test, the question 
in each case is “whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, 
show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having 
adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the 
issuance of a declaratory judgment.”41  Whereas the old test limited 
jurisdiction to reasonable apprehension, the all circumstances test 
broadens the scope of declaratory judgment jurisdiction to include 
circumstances such as a patent holder’s “position” or “willingness” to 
litigate.42
There are some positive benefits resulting from the broadened 
declaratory judgment jurisdiction, including significantly weakening the 
power of “patent trolls.”43  Patent trolls are loosely defined as patent 
holding entities that do not manufacture, compete, or incorporate their 
patents into any product.44  Patent trolls take advantage of the patent 
 40. Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941); SanDisk, 480 
F.3d at 1378; see also Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 
1339 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
41. SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1378. 
42. Id. at 1381.  See Micron Tech., Inc. v. Mosaid Techs., Inc., 518 F.3d 897, 902 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Whether intended or not, the now more lenient legal standard 
facilitates or enhances the availability of declaratory judgment jurisdiction in patent 
cases.”). 
 43. The term patent troll became popular during Intel’s litigation with a little 
known intellectual property licensing company, TechSearch. Intel’s then assistant 
general counsel, Peter Detkin, described a patent troll as “somebody who tries to make a 
lot of money off a patent that they are not practicing and have no intention of practicing 
and in most cases never practiced.”  Jason Rantanen, Slaying the Troll: Litigation as an 
Effective Strategy Against Patent Threats, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 159, 163 (2006) (quoting Elizabeth D. Ferrill, Patent Investment Trusts: Let’s Build 
a PIT to Catch the Patent Trolls, 6 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 367, 367 (2005)).  See also Irfan A. 
Lateef & Joshua Stowell, A Supreme End to Patent Trolls?, ORANGE COUNTY LAW., 
Aug. 2007, at 18–19.  Patent trolls have a “tendency to lie in wait for infringers—like the 
fabled troll that lurks under the bridge to prevent others from using the bridge that he is 
not even using for himself . . . .”  Id.
 44. This definition of a patent troll fails to distinguish between trolls and an 
inventor or even a savvy investor who acquires patent rights and seeks to license them in 
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system by buying patents solely to assert their rights against others.45
Opponents of patent trolls criticize their business practices as disincentivizing 
research and development by increasing the litigation costs associated 
with bringing new products to the market.46  Some analysts believe that a 
more encompassing declaratory judgment jurisdiction standard will 
weaken the power of patent trolls by allowing for a declaratory judgment 
action whenever patent trolls aggressively pursue licensing agreements.47
However, even though the broadened declaratory judgment jurisdiction 
potentially exposes patent trolls to more litigation, high litigation costs 
inevitably arising out of declaratory judgment suits deter many accused 
infringers from ever utilizing declaratory judgments.  For example, in 
the year 2000, mid-range patent infringement litigation cost an average 
of $797,000 through discovery and $1,499,000 through trial.48  Therefore, 
many accused infringers will find this method of resisting trolls to be 
unavailable due to the high cost burden; while the real impact of a 
broadened declaratory judgment standard is suffered by smaller patent 
holders who, due to insufficient funds, cannot take advantage of their 
patent’s positive benefits because they cannot afford to litigate a 
declaratory judgment lawsuit.49
good faith instead of manufacturing or using the patents in commerce directly themselves.  A 
troll is perhaps more properly a party that seeks to license in bad faith, for example, by 
investing in patent rights solely to assert them against deep-pocketed successful manufacturers, 
or even sandbagging a company that unknowingly incorporates a patented component 
into a larger assembly or inadvertently uses a patent while establishing market success.  
By waiting to negotiate a license until after the alleged infringer has sunk significant 
costs into a market success, with little regard as to the validity or strength of the patent’s 
being asserted, a troll is said to be acting in bad faith.  Here is a proposed new definition: 
First, a patent troll would be a company that receives no benefit from 
excluding others because it does not have a competitive product nor does it 
plan to develop one. . . .  Second, a patent troll’s tactic would be to use threat 
of litigation and its associated costs to force others into licensing agreements 
without closely scrutinizing the validity and strength of the patent . . . . 
Benjamin H. Diessel, Trolling for Trolls: The Pitfalls of the Emerging Market 
Competition Requirement for Permanent Injunctions in Patent Cases Post-eBay, 106 
MICH. L. REV. 305, 307 n.2 (2007) (quoting Terrence P. McMahon et al., Who is a Troll? 
Not a Simple Answer, 7 SEDONA CONF. J. 159, 166 (2006)). 
45. See Lateef & Stowell, supra note 43, at 21. 
46. Id.
47. Id. at 22. 
 48. Richard P. Beem, Winning Patent Fights Without Spending a Bundle, CHI.
DAILY L. BULL., Aug. 26, 2003, at 6. 
 49. Rantanen, supra note 43, at 180 (advocating that a potential licensee litigate as 
opposed to license because it will put the licensee in a dominant negotiating position 
over the patentee).  “If the infringer litigates, rather than taking a license, the patentee 
will only gain a small amount, since the litigation costs for the patentee include both the 
possibility of losing the patent entirely and the actual costs of the litigation, while the 
return is likely to be relatively small.”  Id. at 181. 
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Further, the potential troll-deterrent effect of a broader declaratory 
judgment standard may be outweighed by significant negative effects.  
Federal Circuit Judge Bryson concurred with the SanDisk decision, but 
warned that “virtually any invitation to take a paid license relating to the 
prospective licensee’s activities would give rise to an Article III case or 
controversy if the prospective licensee elects to assert that its conduct 
does not fall within the scope of the patent.”50  One district court has 
 50. SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 
2007) (Bryson, J., concurring). 
In the aftermath of MedImmune, SanDisk, and subsequent district court decisions, a 
patent holder’s offer to license a patent to a potential patent infringer constitutes an 
assertion of patent rights and significantly increases the patent holders exposure to a  
declaratory judgment action to attempt to invalidate the patent.  Therefore, the only way 
to avoid declaratory judgment jurisdiction when seeking a license is to preemptively file 
a claim for patent infringement against the potential licensee. 
Although filing an infringement suit exposes the patent holder’s patents to the counter 
claims of unenforceability and invalidity, there is one positive aspect that can result from 
filing first: Any negotiation following a lawsuit is understood as a settlement; in a patent 
infringement lawsuit, if such a settlement is reached, it acts as a collateral bar against any 
future claims of invalidity or unenforceability.  See Flex-Foot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc., 238 
F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2001).  In Flex-Foot, CRP brought a declaratory judgment action 
against Flex-Foot, seeking a declaration that one of Flex-Foot’s patents was invalid.  Id. 
at 1363–64.  While a summary judgment motion was pending, however, the parties 
settled and agreed to a corresponding licensing agreement.  Id. at 1363.  In the settlement 
agreement, CRP waived its right to challenge the validity and enforceability of the patent 
within the license agreement.  Id.  Absent a settlement agreement, a provision such as 
this is not enforced by the courts.  See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 674 (1969).  
However, the Federal Circuit held: 
Once an accused infringer has challenged patent validity, has had an opportunity to 
conduct discovery on validity issues, and has elected to voluntarily dismiss the 
litigation with prejudice under a settlement agreement containing a clear and 
unambiguous undertaking not to challenge validity and/or enforceability of the 
patent in suit, the accused infringer is contractually estopped from raising any 
such challenge in any subsequent proceeding. 
Flex-Foot, 238 F.3d at 1370. 
The Federal Circuit allows a settlement to contractually estop further validity or 
enforceability challenges because the technical requirements of contract doctrine are 
significantly outweighed by the policy of upholding settlement litigation.  Hemstreet v. 
Spiegel, Inc., 851 F.2d 348, 350 (Fed. Cir. 1988).  However, there are obvious problems 
that follow from filing an infringement suit before negotiating.  First, the negotiation is 
instantly soured.  The parties are now directly aligned against each other and the chance 
for a friendly licensing deal is significantly diminished.  Second, filing an infringement 
suit is going to open the door to compulsive counterclaims, such as patent invalidity and 
unenforceability.  Thus, the two claims the patent holder was seeking to avoid in a 
declaratory judgment suit will most assuredly be filed against the patent holder in a 
compulsory counterclaim.  However, the one advantage of filing first is that the patent 
holder can choose the forum.  See Micron Tech., Inc. v. Mosaid Techs., Inc., 518 F.3d 
897, 904 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“The general rule favors the forum of the first-filed action, 
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already expanded declaratory judgment jurisdiction to this extreme.  In 
Crutchfield New Media, L.L.C. v. Charles E. Hill & Associates,51 the 
patent holder offered to negotiate a license, but, before negotiations 
could begin, the potential licensee brought a declaratory judgment suit 
for invalidity and noninfringement of the patents being offered in the 
license.52  The district court sustained the declaratory judgment and held 
that there was a valid case or controversy because “it is clear that Hill 
was of the opinion that Crutchfield was engaging in allegedly infringing 
activity or it would not have offered a license . . . .”53  Under this standard, 
patent holders who offer to negotiate a license can inadvertently open up 
the door to potential declaratory judgment actions.  In this way, the 
expanded MedImmune and SanDisk declaratory judgment standard 
threatens to chill patent licensing discussions and negotiations. 
A prospective licensee can effectively end a licensing negotiation by 
demanding that the patent holder “put up or shut up.”54  In such a 
situation, the prospective licensee can trap the patent holder by inquiring 
as to whether or not the patent holder thinks the prospective licensee is 
infringing on any patents—a yes answer could yield a declaratory 
judgment and a no answer will render negotiations pointless.55  Since the 
SanDisk standard renders licensing negotiations more uncertain, patent 
holders will have to seek ways to avoid being forced to defend their 
patents in a possibly unfavorable court merely because they offered to 
discuss a license.56  In addition to the prospect of being dragged into an 
unfavorable court, declaratory judgments are expensive to litigate.  Thus, 
small inventors, universities, and research institutions, generally, will be 
whether or not it is a declaratory judgment action.”).  This is a big fear in declaratory 
judgment suits because different forums have different rules and some are more 
favorable to patent holders than others.  See also Alisha Kay Taylor, What Does Forum 
Shopping in the Eastern District of Texas Mean for Patent Reform?, 6 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 570, 571 (2007). 
 51. Crutchfield New Media, L.L.C. v. Charles E. Hill & Assoc., No. 1:06-cv-0837-
LJM-JMS, 2007 WL 1320750 (S.D. Ind. May 4, 2007). 
52. Id. at *2–3. 
53. Id. at *2. Cf. Monsanto Co. v. Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc., No. 4:07-CV-543 
(CEJ), 2008 WL 294291, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 31, 2008) (finding that a patent holder’s 
letter asking a prospective licensee to “consider” a license did not amount to a course of 
conduct that shows a preparedness and willingness to enforce patent rights), appeal
dismissed, No. 2008-1232, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 13877 (Fed. Cir. May 30, 2008). 
54. SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1385 (Bryson, J., concurring). 
55. Id. See also Philip Nelson & Paul Conover, Patent Notice Letters After the 
Supreme Court’s MedImmune Decision: Prelude to a Deal, or a License to Sue?,
ORANGE COUNTY LAW., Aug. 2007, at 38, 40. 
56. See Steve Seidenberg, Judgment Day: SanDisk Decision Opens the Door to 
Increased Patent Litigation, INSIDECOUNSEL, Aug. 2007, at 20, 22 (“Right now there is a 
standstill in licensing activity . . . .  Corporations large and small are trying to figure out 
what they can do to protect themselves.” (quoting David Fox, a patent attorney in the 
Houston office of Fulbright & Jaworski)).
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the most vulnerable under the SanDisk precedent because they are less 
likely to have the multibillion dollar resources that large corporations 
have to defend their patents.57
The majority opinion in SanDisk seemed to recognize this threat to 
licensing negotiation and responded in a footnote that a confidentiality 
agreement would have avoided the risk of a declaratory judgment action.58
However, confidentiality agreements create three additional problems.59
First, federal courts interpret confidentiality agreements in accordance 
with state contract law.60  Notwithstanding choice of law conflicts, state 
contract law has a propensity to be ambiguous, amorphous, and unpredictable.61
Second, as acknowledged in his concurrence, Judge Bryson noted the 
absurdity surrounding confidential agreements because any party that 
contemplates bringing a declaratory judgment action would have no 
incentive to enter into such an agreement.62  Third, such a request for a 
confidentiality agreement could itself, ironically, backfire and spark a 
declaratory judgment lawsuit under the SanDisk precedent.63
B. SanDisk Limits the Effectiveness of Covenants Not to Sue 
Following the all circumstances test, the majority in SanDisk found 
STMicroelectronics’ direct and unequivocal statement that it had no plan 
whatsoever to sue did not eliminate any actual controversy and so did 
 57. David Morrill, High Court Ruling Leaves Companies in Pickle, OAKLAND 
TRIB., Mar. 19, 2007, at D5.  Yali Friedman, author of Building Biotechnology, said that 
“[t]ypically, universities are less savvy in developing and negotiating patents, so they 
could be more vulnerable . . . .”  Id.
58. SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1375 n.1. 
 59. Osteotech, Inc. v. Regeneration Techs., Inc., No. 3:06-cv-04249-FLW, 2008 
WL 4449564 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2008). 
60. Id. at *3. 
61. See id.  In Osteotech, the court excluded relevant communications between 
two parties regarding alleged patent infringement.  Id. at *5.  However, the court did not 
limit its analysis to the text of the agreement; rather, the court considered amorphous 
elements, such as the presence of counsel and each party’s familiarity with confidentiality 
agreements.  Id.  Additionally, the confidentiality agreement, although intended to protect the 
plaintiff, backfired because it precluded the plaintiff from using communication covered 
under the agreement as evidence asserting the defendant’s actual knowledge of patent 
infringement. Id.
62. SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1385 n.1 (Bryson, J., concurring). 
 63. Nelson & Conover, supra note 55, at 40. “However, for the vigilant patent 
holder attempting to police the marketplace, such an agreement may be difficult to obtain 
and the very act of requesting it might be enough to trigger a declaratory judgment 
lawsuit.”  Id.
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not render SanDisk’s declaratory judgment claim moot.64  Thus, SanDisk
precedent threatens to significantly narrow the ability of a covenant not 
to sue to avoid declaratory judgment actions. 
Perhaps in recognition of the negative implications associated with not 
recognizing covenants not to sue, the Federal Circuit has twice refined 
the SanDisk holding.65  First, in Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Novartis 
Pharmaceuticals Corp., a generic drug applicant, Teva, challenged 
Novartis by asserting in an “Abbreviated New Drug Application” that 
five of Novartis’s brand drug patents were invalid.66  Despite Novartis’s 
inaction in challenging Teva’s assertion, the Federal Circuit upheld a 
justiciable case or controversy for Teva and acknowledged that the only 
way a controversy might not exist would be in the rare “circumstance in 
which . . . the patent owner and brand drug company have given the generic 
[drug] applicant a covenant not to sue, or otherwise formally acknowledge 
that the generic applicant’s drug does not infringe.”67  Second, in Benitec 
Australia, Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc., patent holder Benitec brought an 
infringement claim against Nucleonics who counterclaimed seeking a 
declaratory judgment of invalidity and unenforceability against Benitec’s 
patents.68  Benitec subsequently dropped its original lawsuit and filed for 
a dismissal of Nucleonics’s counterclaim for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.69  In its appellate brief, Benitec covenanted and promised 
not to sue Nucleonics for any activities or products occurring on or 
before the date of dismissal.70  In light of the covenant not to sue, the 
court granted Benitec’s motion to dismiss after finding no showing of 
sufficient immediacy and reality to support declaratory judgment 
jurisdiction.71
The Nucleonics court directly compared the covenant not to sue with 
the covenant offered in SanDisk, and found the following distinction: 
STMicroelectronics only stated that it did not intend to sue SanDisk, 
while Benitec clarified that it would not sue Nucleonics.72 Also, 
64. SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1382–83. 
65. See Benitec Austl., Ltd., v. Nucleonics, Inc., 495 F.3d 1340, 1347–49 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2055 (2008); Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis 
Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1334–35 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
66. Teva Pharm., 482 F.3d at 1334–35. 
67. Id. at 1343. See also Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 527 F.3d 
1278, 1296–97 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that even when a covenant not to sue 
extinguishes all patent lawsuits, a justiciable controversy exists if a brand drug patent 
holder can still act in a way that would prevent the FDA from approving a generic drug 
application). 
68. Nucleonics, 495 F.3d at 1342. 
69. Id. at 1343. 
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1349. 
72. Id. at 1347–48. 
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STMicroelectronics had engaged in a course of conduct that showed a 
willingness and preparedness to sue, while Benitec made its covenant 
and sought dismissal after it concluded that a recent case legally 
precluded its original infringement claim.73  At first glance, Nucleonics
seems to limit SanDisk’s expansive precedent, but upon closer scrutiny, 
the court actually made its decision based upon Benitec’s legal inability 
to file suit against Nucleonics, not upon Benitec’s covenant not to sue.74
Further, as subsequent cases show, district courts are ignoring a possible 
limiting effect of Nucleonics and are not recognizing any material 
change to the SanDisk precedent regarding the inability of covenants not 
to sue to avoid declaratory judgment jurisdiction.75
For example, in FieldTurf USA, Inc. v. Sports Construction Group,76
the situation was similar to Nucleonics.  FieldTurf voluntarily dismissed 
its original infringement lawsuit against Sports Construction Group and 
subsequently filed for a motion to dismiss Sports Construction Group’s 
declaratory judgment counterclaims against FieldTurf relating to its 
patents.77  To eliminate any further case or controversy, FieldTurf submitted 
a covenant not to sue along with its voluntary dismissal.78  However, the 
court held that the covenant not to sue was too narrow and did not 
preclude FieldTurf from re-filing a different infringement suit.79  The 
court distinguished FieldTurf’s covenant not to sue from the one in 
Nucleonics on the grounds that FieldTurf still had a legal right to 
institute an infringement claim against Sports Construction Group at a 
later date.80
The court’s decision in FieldTurf was focused mainly upon one 
particular element of the Nucleonics opinion: whether the declaratory 
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1346.  The court emphasized Benitec’s recognition of the recent Supreme 
Court decision in Merck that prevented Benitec from filing an infringement action until 
after Nucleonics filed a new drug application, which Nucleonics acknowledged it would 
not do until at least 2010 or 2012.  Id.
75. See FieldTurf USA, Inc. v. Sports Constr. Group, LLC, 507 F. Supp. 2d 801, 
807 (N.D. Ohio 2007); WS Packaging Group, Inc. v. Global Commerce Group, L.L.C., 
505 F. Supp. 561, 565 (E.D. Wis. 2007). 
76. FieldTurf USA, 507 F. Supp. 2d at 801. 
77. Id. at 803. 
78. Id.
79. Id. at 807–08. 
80. Id. at 808 (“FieldTurf has maintained its right to institute an infringement 
cause of action against SCG for its offers to sell, sales, or installations at locations other 
than at Concord University.”). 
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judgment defendant has any cause of action against the declaratory 
judgment plaintiff.81  Under such precedent, a covenant not to sue that 
eliminates the current, or instant, case or controversy is not effective 
unless it eliminates all other potential infringement causes of action that 
that party has against the declaratory judgment plaintiff.82 This is an 
incongruous proposition for two reasons. First, MedImmune limits 
declaratory judgment jurisdiction to “the facts alleged.”83 A covenant not 
to sue should not have to cover all possible relationships between the 
parties, but only those that deal with the current facts alleged. It is unjust 
to hold a covenant not to sue to a standard that incorporates facts beyond 
those alleged in the lawsuit.  Second, such a precedent renders licensing 
agreements pointless. Similar to the “put up or shut up” scenario 
articulated in Judge Bryson’s concurrence in SanDisk,84 the only 
effective way to eliminate the risk of a declaratory judgment action 
during licensing negotiations under this precedent is for the patent holder to 
forfeit any possible future enforcement of rights in the invention, which 
makes the current licensing negotiation pointless. A patent holder’s 
entire bargaining power hinges on the threat of enforcement against the 
other party.85  Therefore, since covenants not to sue that completely 
eliminate any potential liability gut a patent holder’s bargaining position, 
the courts have effectively eliminated the desirability of using a covenant 
not to sue to eliminate declaratory judgment jurisdiction.  This, in turn, 
may also render licensing negotiations pointless because the patent 
holder would have to deny any future infringement claims in order to 
 81. This is of such importance that the court mentions it twice verbatim.  See id.
 82. Two recent district court decisions have turned away from the notion that 
effective covenants not to sue have to extinguish all possible causes of action between 
two parties.  In Furminator, Inc. v. Ontel Products Corp., 246 F.R.D. 579 (E.D. Mo. 
2007), a patent holder’s covenant not to sue sufficiently eliminated any case of actual 
controversy and divested the court of jurisdiction even though the covenant did not cover 
a supplemental patent that was not at issue in the original claim.  Id. at 590. The court 
reasoned that the patent excluded from the covenant not to sue was distinctly different 
from the patents currently at issue and because no demands or threats of litigation were 
made through this patent, there was no remaining controversy of sufficient immediacy 
and reality to warrant declaratory judgment jurisdiction.  Id. at 590–91.  Similarly, in 
Crossbow Technology, Inc. v. YH Technology, 531 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (N.D. Cal. 2007), 
the court concluded that despite the existence of related patents, the covenant not to sue 
sufficiently removed all patents at issue in the case and thus extinguished declaratory 
judgment jurisdiction.  Id. at 1122. 
 83. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007).  “[T]he 
question in each case is whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that 
there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of 
sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.”  Id.
(quoting Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)). 
 84. SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1385–86 n.2 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007) (Bryson, J., concurring). 
 85. EMC Corp. v. Norand Corp., 89 F.3d 807, 811 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
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negotiate a license without threat of a declaratory judgment suit, but this 
denial of claims obliterates a patent holder’s bargaining position. 
C. SanDisk Limits District Court Discretion 
The third implication of SanDisk is that it limits the district court’s 
discretion to deny jurisdiction over an otherwise allowable declaratory 
judgment action.  The Declaratory Judgment Act provides: 
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except with respect to 
Federal taxes . . . , any court of the United States, upon the filing of an 
appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any 
interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or 
could be sought.  Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final 
judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.86
In the absence of a must, the Federal Circuit has, before SanDisk,
interpreted the Act’s use of may to mean both “that the court is 
authorized to declare legal rights and relations, and that in appropriate 
circumstances the court may decline to do so.”87  Therefore, even if an 
actual case or controversy exists, courts have the discretion to decline 
jurisdiction.88  The Supreme Court has held that the district court is in 
the most appropriate position to understand how the facts of the case 
relate in regards to both the fitness and usefulness of a declaratory 
judgment resolution.89  A district court’s discretion is constrained by the 
Declaratory Judgment Act, which has been interpreted by the Federal 
Circuit to limit the district court’s discretion to the bounds of practicality 
and wise judicial administration.90
 86. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000) (emphasis added). 
 87. Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F.2d 931, 936 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  The 
Federal Circuit’s interpretation has also been accepted by the Supreme Court.  See
MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 136. 
 88. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Wycoft Co., 344 U.S. 237, 241 (1952). 
 89. Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 289 (1995). 
90. EMC Corp., 89 F.3d at 814.  See also Sony Elecs., Inc. v. Guardian Media 
Techs., Ltd., 497 F.3d 1271, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (presenting four ways a district court 
can abuse its discretion: “(1) [T]he court’s decision [is] clearly unreasonable, arbitrary, 
or fanciful; (2) the decision [is] based on an erroneous conclusion of law; (3) the court’s 
findings [are] clearly erroneous; or (4) the record contains no evidence upon which the 
court rationally could have based its decision” (quoting Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. 
Norton Co., 929 F.2d 670, 673 (Fed. Cir. 1991))). 
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In SanDisk, however, the Federal Circuit further limited the district 
court’s discretion.91  The district court in SanDisk noted, in a footnote, 
that “even if it had subject matter jurisdiction over the instant claims, it 
would exercise its discretion and decline to decide them.”92  However, 
the Federal Circuit held that the district court’s decision was made in the 
context of the reasonable apprehension of suit test, thus they “expect that 
in the absence of additional facts, the case will be entertained on the 
merits on remand.”93  In light of this unusual holding that removed the 
district court’s customary discretion, Judge Bryson’s concurrence took 
issue with the majority, and would limit the SanDisk holding to allow 
the district court to exercise its discretion on remand to address issues 
such as a possible parallel infringement action in another district.94
The reasoning of Judge Bryson’s argument becomes apparent in a 
later Federal Circuit case, Sony Electronics, Inc. v. Guardian Media 
Technologies, Ltd.95 In this case, the district court underlined two 
reasons to decline jurisdiction: The justiciability of the case was too 
close to call and the overall facts created the “appearance that Plaintiffs 
filed these lawsuits as an intimidation tactic to gain leverage in the 
licensing negotiations.”96  The Federal Circuit held that it was an abuse 
of discretion for the district judge to decline to exercise his discretion to 
hear the suit, noting that it was inappropriate to infer that the suit was 
filed as an intimidation tactic in the absence of affirmative evidence.97
The majority opinion stated, “Even if these suits have had the effect of 
placing appellants in a more favorable negotiating position, that effect is 
 91. SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 
2007).
92. Id. (quoting SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., No. 04-04379, 2005 
WL 5801276, at *8 n.30 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2005)). 
93. Id.
 94. “I would allow the district court to reconsider that issue based on all the 
circumstances, not just ‘additional facts’ not previously before the district court, as the 
terms of this court’s remand would seem to require.”  Id. at 1385–86 n.2 (Bryson, J., 
concurring). 
95. Sony Elecs., 497 F.3d at 1271. 
96. Id. at 1289. 
97. Id.  The court also narrowed a former opinion, EMC Corp. v. Norand Corp., 89 
F.3d 807 (Fed. Cir. 1996), that allowed the district judge to exercise the judge’s 
discretion not to hear the case under similar circumstances.  The court distinguished Sony
Electronics from EMC by stating that the declaratory judgment plaintiff in the latter 
“called the defendant the day after the suit was filed ‘and explained that the declaratory 
judgment complaint had been filed as “merely a defensive step” . . . .’”  Sony Elecs., 497 
F.3d at 1289 (quoting EMC Corp., 89 F.3d at 815). Thus, the Federal Circuit determined 
that the district court in EMC had proper evidence to deny jurisdiction based on the 
belief that the declaratory judgment was a “tactical measure filed in order to improve 
[the plaintiff’s] posture in the ongoing negotiations.” Sony Elecs., 497 F.3d at 1289 
(quoting EMC Corp., 89 F.3d at 815).
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not a sufficient reason to decline to hear the suit.”98  The Federal Circuit 
has limited the district court judge’s discretion to refuse to hear a patent 
declaratory judgment case to only matters of time and resources.99  This 
precedent undercuts a judge’s ability to prevent forum shopping or other 
“nefarious”100 litigation moves on the part of declaratory judgment 
plaintiffs.  Limiting the district court judge’s discretion to decline to hear 
a suit allows the potential licensee to unfairly take advantage of the 
judicial system during licensing negotiations. 
Ultimately SanDisk’s three negative repercussions are likely to 
significantly chill patent licensing negotiations out of court because all 
three open the door to greater availability of a declaratory judgment.  A 
broad declaratory judgment jurisdiction puts the patent holder in a no-
win situation between offering a license and risking the expense and 
possible unfair bargaining position following a declaratory judgment 
suit, or never offering a license and never taking advantage of the rights 
to exclusively make, use, or sell their invention as granted to patent 
holders.101  The limited applicability of a covenant not to sue to prevent 
a declaratory judgment suit takes away one avenue that could possibly 
level the playing field between a patent holder and a potential licensee in 
negotiations.102  Finally, limiting a district court judge’s ability to deny 
adjudicating a declaratory judgment suit when out-of-court negotiations 
98. Sony Elecs., 497 F.3d at 1289. 
 99. Post-SanDisk, the Federal Circuit allowed district judges to exercise their discretion 
to not hear a declaratory judgment only in cases involving parallel infringement suits or 
patent reevaluations. See Cellco P’ship v. Broadcom Corp., 227 F. App’x 889, 890 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007). 
100. Sony Elecs., 497 F.3d at 1289. 
 101. Section 271 of Title 35 of the United States Code gives the patent holder an 
infringement cause of action against anyone who makes, uses, sells, offers for sale, or 
imports the invention described in the claims of the patent.  35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000). 
 102. Michael A. Ladra and Lillian Ewing argue: 
There is no longer a safe haven for a patentee to offer a license and expressly 
state that there is no intent to sue for infringement. . . .  The potential licensee, 
who has more leverage after SanDisk, can respond with “put up or shut up,” 
and virtually any response by the patentee to the potential licensee, other than a 
disavowal of patent coverage, will expose the patentee to a potential declaratory 
judgment action.  The dissent in SanDisk correctly asserted that there is potentially 
no “stopping point short of allowing declaratory judgment actions in 
virtually any case in which the recipient of an invitation to take a patent license 
elects to dispute the need for a license and then to sue the patentee.” 
Michael A. Ladra & Lillian Ewing, Declaratory Judgment Practices After SanDisk v. 
STMicroelectronics, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 185, 198 (2007)
(quoting SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1385 (Bryson, J., concurring)). 
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are proceeding chills the motivation of a potential licensee to negotiate 
without first attempting a declaratory judgment suit. 
IV. POLICY SUPPORT FOR A CHANGE IN DECLARATORY                           
JUDGMENT PRECEDENT
Declaratory judgment jurisdiction seeks to balance two competing 
policy considerations: conserving limited judicial resources by declining 
jurisdiction and allowing a party threatened with legal action to obtain 
an early judgment regarding its rights and liabilities.103  Congressional 
intent behind the Declaratory Judgment Act was particularly focused on 
preventing “avoidable damages from being incurred by a person uncertain 
of his rights and threatened with damage by delayed adjudication.”104
The 1934 Congress sought to balance the economic leverage once 
dominated by patent holders through the availability of an early judicial 
resolution of rights.105  Congress’s willingness to have judicial resolution 
available for alleged infringers was a response to the business realities 
these alleged infringers faced—to level the negotiating table that had 
previously been tipped heavily toward patent holders.106  This Comment 
argues that the MedImmune and SanDisk expanded declaratory judgment 
jurisdiction standard has tipped the negotiating table too far in favor of 
alleged infringers, and so the policy rationale behind the Declaratory 
Judgment Act supports a change in declaratory judgment jurisdiction to 
re-level the field and conserve limited judicial resources. 
Three recent Federal Circuit and Supreme Court decisions bridle the 
patent holder’s power enough to render the need for an expansive declaratory 
judgment jurisdiction unnecessary: In re Seagate Technology, EBay v. 
Mercexchange, and KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.107  As discussed 
below, the aggregate of these decisions is to ease the burden faced by an 
 103. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Norton Co., 929 F.2d 670, 673 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
104. Id. (citing EDWIN BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 803–04 (2d. ed. 
1941)).
105. See 78 CONG. REC. 10,564–65, 10,919 (1934); 78 CONG. REC. 8224 (1934).
 106. Lisa A. Dolak, Declaratory Judgment Jurisdiction in Patent Cases: Restoring 
the Balance Between the Patentee and the Accused Infringer, 38 B.C. L. REV. 903, 905
(1997).
In 1934, Congress sought to balance the tremendous economic leverage enjoyed by 
patentees by providing accused infringers with the opportunity to seek judicial 
resolution of claims of non-infringement and/or invalidity. . . .  The courts’ 
willingness to entertain declaratory judgment actions brought by alleged 
infringers in such circumstances was based on their recognition of the 
‘business realities’ the alleged infringers faced. 
Id. at 905–06. 
107. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007); EBay, Inc. v. 
Mercexchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006); In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360 
(Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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alleged infringer, and so the MedImmune and SanDisk decisions, expanding 
declaratory judgment jurisdiction go too far, extending beyond the 
optimum policy balance sought between patent holders and alleged 
patent infringers, and instead creating “uncertainty and inefficiency in 
the area of patent notification . . . .”108
In re Seagate eases the burden on patent infringers resisting 
allegations of willful infringement and the resulting treble damages, by 
eliminating the duty of due care and emphasizing that there is no 
affirmative obligation to obtain an opinion of counsel.109  As a result, a 
patent holder’s boilerplate charge of “willful infringement” is no longer 
a simple burden to satisfy.110  The Federal Circuit replaced the negligence 
standard of willful infringement with an objective recklessness standard— 
this requires a showing by clear and convincing evidence that the accused 
infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood of infringement, 
and the infringer knew or, because of its obviousness, should have known 
about the high likelihood of infringement.111
In re Seagate impacts declaratory judgment jurisdiction in two ways.  
First, because patent owners will need to give potential infringers 
detailed notice of how they are allegedly infringing to set the stage for 
showing reckless disregard of their patents, these notices will likely be 
sufficient to invoke declaratory judgment jurisdiction.112  In the absence 
of a detailed letter, potential infringers will likely not be subject to a suit 
for willful infringement of the patent in question.  This limits the patent 
holder’s negotiating power by forcing a choice: either send a detailed 
letter and invoke declaratory judgment jurisdiction, or send a benign 
letter to avoid declaratory judgment lawsuits but forego claiming willful 
infringement.113
In re Seagate’s second impact is that it runs counter to a fundamental 
policy behind expanded declaratory judgment jurisdiction.  As mentioned, a 
cornerstone policy of the Declaratory Judgment Act is to reduce the 
likelihood of possible infringers finding themselves in an unfair position, 
either having to risk accruing huge damages while awaiting a patent 
 108. Nelson & Conover, supra note 55, at 42. 
109. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371. 
 110. Thomas Fitzpatrick et al., In re Seagate Technology: Closing the Gate on 
Willful Infringement, MONDAQ BUS. BRIEFING, Aug. 28, 2007, available at http://www. 
mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=51720. 
111. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371. 
112. See Fitzpatrick et al., supra note 110. 
113. Id.
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holder’s choice to file an infringement suit, or having to prematurely 
shut down their business.114  This same rationale was one of the driving 
reasons behind the MedImmune and SanDisk decisions to expand declaratory 
judgment jurisdiction, specifically that “[t]he rule that a plaintiff must 
destroy a large building, bet the farm, or (as here) risk treble damages
and the loss of 80 percent of its business, before seeking a declaration of 
its actively contested legal rights finds no support in Article III.”115
Willful infringement of a patent exposes the infringing party to treble 
damages, and in such cases, betting the farm is an accurate metaphor.116
However, in the wake of In re Seagate, if a patent holder requests a 
license without giving the potential infringer a detailed report of their 
infringement, this request is not enough evidence to support a willful 
infringement claim against the potential patent infringer.117  Good policy 
would dictate that standards for notice of willful infringement should be 
consistent with declaratory judgment jurisdiction.118  Therefore, since 
the standard to establish willful infringement requires a detailed report of 
infringement, declaratory judgment jurisdiction should not be granted 
against patentees that merely offer notice of possible patent infringement.  
The unfair risk of an alleged infringer accruing huge damages is now 
reduced by In re Seagate because the uncertainty of possible treble damages 
 114. “[I]n promulgating the Declaratory Judgment Act, Congress intended ‘to avoid 
accrual of avoidable damages to one not certain of his rights and to afford him an early 
adjudication without waiting until his adversary should see fit to begin suit.’”  Minn. 
Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Norton Co., 929 F.2d 670, 673–74 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (quoting E. 
Edelmann & Co. v. Triple-A Specialty Co., 88 F.2d 852, 854 (7th Cir. 1937)). 
 115. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 548 U.S. 118, 134 (2007) (emphasis 
added).  Also, the court in SanDisk paraphrased this same argument stating, “SanDisk 
need not ‘bet the farm,’ so to speak, and risk a suit for infringement by cutting off licensing 
discussions and continuing in the identified activity before seeking a declaration of its 
legal rights.”  SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 
2007) (footnote omitted). 
 116. In cases of willful infringement, “the court may enter judgment thereon for any 
sum above the amount found by the verdict as the actual damages sustained, according to 
the circumstances of the case, not exceeding three times the amount of such verdict, 
together with the costs.”  Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 59, 16 Stat. 198, 207 (1870). 
 117. Even if the opinion letters served as an objectively high likelihood of patent 
infringement, the patentee would still need to prove that this objectively defined risk 
“was either known or so obvious that it should have been known to the accused 
infringer.”  In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 118. Dolak, supra note 106, at 946.  Dolak also states: “[T]he issues of notice of 
infringement and declaratory judgment jurisdiction should be treated as jurisprudentially 
connected because of the policies each legal principle is intended to serve and the practical 
realities that would-be litigants must consider in the operation of their enterprises.”  Id. at 
938 (footnote omitted).  Dolak wrote this article before the MedImmune, SanDisk, and In
re Seagate decisions, so she advocates a more liberal declaratory judgment standard.  
She argues that it is unconstitutional to deny declaratory judgment jurisdiction when 
notice of infringement letters are delivered and when these same letters can be used as 
evidence for willful infringement against potential infringers.  Id. at 946. 
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can no longer be attached without triggering declaratory judgment 
jurisdiction.  Thus, one key policy rationale for expanding declaratory 
judgment jurisdiction is mitigated, at least in part, by In re Seagate.
In EBay v. Mercexchange, the Supreme Court eliminated the Federal 
Circuit’s previously observed strong presumption in favor of injunctive 
relief for patent infringement, and instead required a four factor test be 
used to determine if an injunction is appropriate based on the facts in 
any given case.119  This decision limits the power of the patent troll, who 
often relies on the threat of a possible injunction that could shut down an 
alleged infringer’s entire business to leverage licensing negotiations.  As 
explained earlier, declaratory judgment jurisdiction is a strong disincentive 
to patent trolls and significantly weakens their leverage.120  For example, 
a motivating factor behind the Federal Circuit’s Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, 
Inc. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. decision was that declaratory 
judgment jurisdiction limits the ability of the patent troll to engage in 
extrajudicial patent enforcement with “scare-the-customer-and-run tactics.”121
But after EBay, a patent troll’s leverage over an alleged infringer is 
already reduced, due to the reduced prospect of obtaining an injunction; 
thus, expanded declaratory judgment jurisdiction for the purpose of 
deterring patent trolls is no longer quite as justified. 
Before EBay, there was a strong incentive for possible infringers to 
use a declaratory judgment to avoid costly injunctions that had the 
capability to completely shut down a product or business.122  Since the 
EBay decision, district courts implementing injunctions under the EBay
rule have almost universally held that when the patent holder manufactures 
or sells a product that competes with the accused product, the patent 
holder can successfully prove irreparable harm.  But when the patent 
holder does not manufacture or sell a competitive product, courts refuse 
 119. In the four factor test, the plaintiff must show: 
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, 
such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) 
that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, 
a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be 
disserved by a permanent injunction. 
EBay, Inc. v. Mercexchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
120. See Lateef & Stowell, supra note 43, at 22. 
 121. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1336 n.2 
(Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 122. Lateef & Stowell, supra note 43, at 21.  “From the perspective of a potential 
infringer, the Federal Circuit’s old rule heavily incentivized settlement and licensing.”  
Id.
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to recognize any cognizable irreparable harm necessary for an injunction 
against the accused infringer, the irreparable harm test is not satisfied.123
Thus, the primary factor in determining whether a court will grant an 
injunction is the plaintiff’s status as a market competitor.124  By definition, 
patent trolls do not manufacture products that incorporate their patents—
so the EBay decision significantly limits the patent troll’s scare-the-
customer-and-run tactics, because the patent troll can no longer threaten 
injunctions.  Therefore, the policy justification to expand declaratory 
judgment jurisdiction to level the negotiating table against too powerful 
patent-holders is again reduced. 
Last, the Supreme Court has made it easier for a patent challenger to 
invalidate a patent by showing obviousness.125  In KSR International Co. 
v. Teleflex, Inc., the Supreme Court narrowly limited the Federal Circuit’s 
“Teaching-Suggestion-Motivation” (TSM) test for when multiple prior 
art references could be combined to show a patent was invalid as obvious.  
Instead, the Court established a simpler analysis for determining obviousness, 
which lowers the hurdle to get a patent declared invalid by permitting a 
greater range of prior art to be used to prove a patent invalid for 
obviousness.126
123. See Keith Slenkovich, U.S. Supreme Court Decisions in Ebay, MedImmune,
and KSR Deliver Triple Dose of Bad News to Non-Practicing Patent Holders (Aka 
“Patent Trolls”), MONDAQ BUSINESS BRIEFING, Sept. 7, 2007, available at http://www. 
mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=52066.  In the short time since the EBay decision, 
courts are reflecting the trend of granting permanent injunctions only when both parties 
manufacture a competitive product.  Several cases exemplify the courts’ willingness to 
grant permanent injunctions when both parties manufacture and sell competitive 
products. See, e.g., Brooktrout, Inc. v. Eicon Networks Corp., No. 2:03-CV-59, 2007 
WL 1730112 (E.D. Tex. June 14, 2007); MGM Well Servs., Inc. v. Mega Lift Sys., 
L.L.C., 505 F. Supp. 2d 359 (S.D. Tex. 2007); Novozymes v. Genencor Int’l, Inc., 474 F. 
Supp. 2d 592, 596 (D. Del. 2007); Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 
Nos. CIV A 06-757, CIV A 06-5166, CIV A 04-1689, 2007 WL 869545 (D.N.J. Mar. 
20, 2007); 02 Micro Int’l, Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., No. CIV A 2-04-CV-
32, 2007 WL 869576 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 21, 2007); Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite Co., No. 
CV-96-5658, 2006 WL 2844400 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2006); Telequip Corp. v. Change 
Exch., No. 5:01-CV-1748, 2006 WL 2385425 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2006); TiVo, Inc. v. 
EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 446 F. Supp. 2d 664, 669 (E.D. Tex. 2006). 
124. See Benjamin H. Diessel, supra note 44.  Diessel argues: 
Denying injunctions to plaintiffs who do not compete in the market with their 
invention yet are willing licensors and granting injunctions to plaintiffs who 
compete in the market against the defendant are consistent with a rule that 
requires market competition to obtain a permanent injunction, and thus far 
courts have followed these practices. 
Id. at 318. 
125. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct., 1745–46 (2007).  Non-obviousness is 
a condition of patentability codified in 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000). Non-obviousness requires 
that the patented product be one that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not know 
how to create given the same materials.  See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000); KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1740. 
 126. Under the Federal Circuit’s TSM test, “a patent claim is only proved obvious if 
‘some motivation or suggestion to combine the prior art teachings’ can be found in the 
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The KSR decision deters patent holders from engaging in tactics that 
will likely bring an invalidity suit against any of their patents.127  In 
particular, patent holders whose patents lack commercial success suffer 
the most because one of the objective indicators of non-obviousness 
emphasized in KSR is commercial success.128  Additionally, a patent 
holder most often risks more during a declaratory judgment action than 
an alleged patent infringer.129  If a patent holder loses an invalidity suit, 
the ability to assert that patent’s rights against all competitors is lost.130
Therefore, KSR empowers the declaratory judgment plaintiff with a 
powerful weapon against patent holders in negotiation. 
The KSR decision risks upsetting the delicate negotiation balance 
between a patent holder and potential patent infringer.  During a license 
negotiation, a patent holder’s leverage is dependent upon the validity of 
the patents being offered.131  Likewise, a potential patent infringer must 
weigh the cost of invalidating the offered patent against the cost of a 
prior art, the nature of the problem, or the knowledge of a person having ordinary skill in 
the art.”  KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1734 (citing Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 
1323–24 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).  Under KSR, to determine obviousness the court questions 
“whether . . . a designer of ordinary skill, facing the wide range of needs created by 
developments in the field of endeavor, would have” thought of the patent as obvious.  
KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1744. 
 127. Because the KSR decision lowers the bar for obviousness, “[p]arties charged 
with infringement will have a stronger legal basis for invalidating patents, particularly on 
summary judgment.  Thus, the decision decreases the impact of threatened patent suits, 
especially when weak patents are at issue.”  Lateef & Stowell, supra note 43, at 22. 
 128. “Against this background the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject 
matter is determined.  Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but 
unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances 
surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented.” KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 
1734 (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966)). 
 129. Jason Rantanen argues: 
[T]he only positive payoff available to the patentee through litigation is if there 
is a finding of no invalidity and infringement.  In contrast, the infringer will 
receive a positive payoff either if the patent is declared invalid, or if they are 
found not to infringe.  This game also demonstrates why the patent troll may 
be disincentivized to enter the litigation.  If the patentee wins, the payoff is only 
modest.  If the patentee loses, however, the penalty ranges from moderately severe 
to extremely severe, depending on the form of the loss. 
Rantanen, supra note 43, at 180. 
130. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 
(1971) (holding that a patent holder is estopped from asserting the validity of a patent 
that has been held to be invalid in a prior federal court suit where the patent holder had 
full and fair opportunity to litigate the validity of the patent). 
 131. Rantanen, supra note 43, at 195–96. 
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potential license for the patent.132  Therefore, when the difficulty of 
invalidating a patent is reduced, the potential patent infringer can take 
advantage of the patent holder’s uncertainty over the validity of the patent.  
Because a declaratory judgment allows the potential patent infringer to 
challenge the patent being offered, the threat of declaratory judgment 
becomes a stronger tool that potential infringers can use to gain leverage 
in licensing negotiations.  Therefore, by adding a looser declaratory 
judgment jurisdiction to an already lower burden to invalidate a patent, 
the delicate balance of a license negotiation shifts too far to the advantage of 
the potential patent infringer.  As a result, the patent holder is once again 
put in the unfavorable scenario of pursuing a license and risking a 
declaration of invalidity, or not pursuing a license and being denied the 
benefits associated with holding a patent. 
In sum, in a situation where a patent holder wants to flex a patent in 
order to get a license, the patent holder must consider several negative 
factors: the potential that a willful infringement claim will immediately 
subject the holder to a declaratory judgment suit, the reduced ability to 
get an injunction, and the likelihood of an invalidity claim based on the 
obviousness of the patent.  All of these factors deter a patent holder from 
attempting to victimize competitors through extrajudicial patent enforcement, 
which in turn reduces the need for a more expansive declaratory 
judgment jurisdiction and tips the desired policy balance enough to 
possibly even jeopardize a patent holder’s ability to fairly license a 
patent.133
V. PROPOSING A NEW DECLARATORY JUDGMENT TEST
As apparent from the discussion above, the current all circumstances 
standard for declaratory judgment jurisdiction in patent cases, as applied 
in the Federal Circuit, is incongruent with the policy rationale of the 
Declaratory Judgment Act.  While the standard is safely within Article 
III’s constitutional bounds, it does not account for current business realities.  
The Declaratory Judgment Act was passed to maintain a balance between 
the potential licensee and the patent holder by giving the potential 
licensee a weapon to counteract a patent holder’s attempted extra-judicial 
enforcement of the holder’s patent.134  This balance is achieved through the 
132. Id. at 195–97. 
133. See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1336 n.2 
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (stating “[b]efore declaratory judgment provisions, competitors were 
‘victimized’ by patent owners who engaged in ‘extrajudicial patent enforcement . . . .’”). 
 134. The Declaratory Judgment Act “serves the policies underlying the patent laws 
by enabling a test of the validity and infringement of patents that are possibly being used 
only as what Learned Hand, in Bresnick v. United States Vitamin Corp., 139 F.2d 239, 
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action of two justiciability restraints over declaratory judgment jurisdiction: 
constitutional and discretionary considerations.135  The Supreme Court’s 
decision in MedImmune and the Federal Circuit’s decision in SanDisk
incorporate the constitutional bounds of declaratory judgment jurisdiction, 
but unduly limit the discretionary considerations inherent within the 
Declaratory Judgment Act. 
The Declaratory Judgment Act articulates a two step jurisdictional 
analysis: First, the court determines whether the lawsuit satisfies an 
Article III case or controversy; second, the court weighs the relevant 
prudential considerations to determine the appropriateness of exercising 
jurisdiction.136  As explained in SanDisk, the first step of this analysis—
the constitutional requirement—is satisfied whenever the declaratory 
judgment plaintiff is put in position of “either pursuing arguably illegal 
behavior or abandoning that which he claims a right to do.”137  However, 
the Federal Circuit stops the jurisdictional analysis here and has all but 
eliminated a discretionary element unless there is some other pending 
litigation.138
Specifically, the Federal Circuit has limited a trial judge’s discretionary 
analysis to the convenience factors associated with 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).139
Under a § 1404(a) analysis, a judge may use his discretion to deny 
jurisdiction only in the interests of justice or expediency.140  Unfortunately, 
242 (2d Cir. 1943), called ‘scarecrows.’”  Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, 
Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 735 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 135. “In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, . . . any court of the 
United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and 
other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration . . . .”  28 U.S.C. 
§ 2201 (2000).  Declaratory judgment is a negative right.  It does not have to be granted 
to the full extent as provided by the Constitution, but it may be granted to the full extent.  
The constitutional considerations of this Act make sure that jurisdiction stays within the 
bounds of Article III, while the discretionary considerations give the courts the ability to 
limit jurisdiction when it would be most prudent to do so.  Lisa A. Dolak, Power or 
Prudence: Toward a Better Standard for Evaluating Patent Litigants’ Access to the 
Declaratory Judgment Remedy, 41 U.S.F. L. REV. 407, 424–25 (2007). 
 136. Dolak, supra note 135, at 424. 
 137. SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 
2007).
138. See Cellco P’ship v. Broadcom Corp., 227 F. App’x 889, 890 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 139. Micron Tech., Inc. v. Mosaid Techs., Inc., 518 F.3d 897, 904 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  
The § 1404(a) convenience factors include: a party’s intention to preempt another’s 
infringement suit, convenience and availability of the witnesses, the absence of 
jurisdiction over all necessary or desirable parties, and the possibility of consolidation 
with related litigation.  Id.
140. Id.
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this interpretation of the discretionary element in the Declaratory Judgment 
Act is too limited because it seeks only to quell forum shopping instead 
of narrowing declaratory judgment availability.141 The appropriate 
discretionary analysis must account for the party’s business realities and 
the existence of two contrary classes of patent holders—patent trolls and 
quiescent patent holders.142
This Comment advocates appropriately expanding the discretionary 
power granted to district court judges in the Declaratory Judgment Act, 
to better refine and narrow declaratory judgment jurisdiction in patent 
cases.  Using discretion, district courts should analyze the appropriateness 
of a declaratory judgment on a case-by-case basis, and favor granting 
declaratory judgment actions against patent trolls but not quiescent 
patent holders.  In applying discretionary considerations to a declaratory 
judgment suit, this Comment recommends three relevant inquiries a 
district court should consider that relate to equity and policy: (A) the 
patent holder’s economic function and stance; (B) the immediacy of the 
case; and (C) a patent holder’s willingness to negotiate and end the 
controversy out of court. 
A.  Patent Holder’s Economic Function and Stance 
The Supreme Court is already beginning to recognize the different 
economic functions of a quiescent patent holder and an aggressive patent 
owner.143  In EBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence recognized the difference between patent trolls and regular 
patent owners and even went as far as to say that this recognition should 
bear upon the outcome of a case: 
141. Id. at 905.  “Eventually, robust consideration of these factors will reduce the 
incentives for a race to the courthouse because both parties will realize that the case will 
be heard or transferred to the most convenient or suitable forum.”  Id.
 142. The term quiescent patent holder was coined in Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. 
v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 736 (Fed. Cir. 1988).  In this case, the Federal Circuit 
used the term to describe patent holding defendants that do nothing to cause reasonable 
apprehension.  Id. The court seemed to hint that quiescent status was determined by the 
activities or inactivity of the patent holder.  Did they actively litigate their patents or 
intend to litigate their patents?  Id.  For the purposes of this Article, a quiescent patent 
holder includes good faith licensors who do not act in troll-like behavior.  This would 
include: inventors, for whom going into the market themselves is simply not 
economical or feasible, and thus who instead decide to license; savvy businessmen, who 
in good faith are in the business of buying patent properties in order to license them to 
others to develop at fair and reasonable prices; and, of course, typical, manufacturing, good 
faith licensors. 
143. See EBay, Inc. v. Mercexchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring).
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In cases now arising trial courts should bear in mind that in many instances the 
nature of the patent being enforced and the economic function of the patent 
holder present considerations quite unlike earlier cases.  An industry has developed 
in which firms use patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, 
instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.144
Justice Kennedy was joined by Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, and 
Justice Breyer.  Thus, four out of five justices already believe that the 
nature of the patent being enforced and the patent holder’s present 
condition should carry weight in judicial decisionmaking.  However, 
Justice Roberts’s concurrence in EBay, joined by Justice Scalia and 
Justice Ginsberg, acknowledged the precedent of equitable discretion by 
the courts, but would limit its reach, and did not expressly recognize a 
need to expand discretion to encompass patent trolls.145
In declaratory judgment cases, the only way courts can distinguish 
between aggressive patent trolls and quiescent patent holders is through 
the application of prudential considerations.  One district court decision, 
keen on the use of discretion, explained: 
The controversy thus becomes ripe for adjudication as soon as the initial threat 
of patent litigation is made; but so long as one party reasonably relies on the 
forbearance of the other during subsequent negotiations, there may be equitable 
and public policy reasons for discretionary dismissal of a declaratory action 
when one party unfairly takes advantage of that forbearance to secure a more 
convenient forum.146
Although there have as of yet been no cases that deny a declaratory 
judgment based solely on the patent holder’s economic function,147 there 
have been several district court decisions that evaluated the aggressiveness 
of the patent holder’s stance when deciding to exercise declaratory 
judgment jurisdiction.148  In Bridgelux, Inc. v. Cree, Inc., Cree was a 
144. Id.
 145. “[T]here is a difference between exercising equitable discretion pursuant to the 
established four-factor test and writing on an entirely clean slate.  ‘Discretion is not 
whim, and limiting discretion according to legal standards helps promote the basic 
principle of justice that like cases should be decided alike.’”  Id. at 395 (Roberts, J., 
concurring) (quoting Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 140 (2005)). 
 146. Agridyne Techs., Inc. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 863 F. Supp. 1522, 1527 n.6 (D. 
Utah 1994). 
 147. The Author performed the following Westlaw search on July 6, 2008: (economic 
function or economic stance or economic condition) and declaratory judgment.
148. See, e.g., BridgeLux, Inc. v. Cree, Inc., No. C 06-6495 PJH, 2007 WL 
2022024 (N.D. Cal. July 9, 2007); Cimline, Inc. v. Crafco, Inc., No. 07-3997, 2007 WL 
4591957 (D. Minn. Dec. 28, 2007); Monolithic Power Sys., Inc. v. 02 Micro Int’l Ltd., 
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competitor of Bridgelux, and had made statements reflecting the company’s 
“intention to defend its technology.”149  However, Cree had never accused 
Bridgelux of infringing any of its patents.150  Noting the normalcy of 
Cree’s actions and stating that “the same could be said of many patent 
holders,” the district court concluded that there was not “sufficient immediacy 
and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.”151
Similarly, in Prasco, L.L.C. v. Medicis Pharmaceutical Corp., the 
district court looked at prior litigation between the parties to determine 
Medicis’s litigation tendencies and whether or not they have a history of 
aggressively pushing licensing deals.152  Although there was prior litigation 
between the parties, because this litigation involved a different product 
and a different patent, the court could not “conclude that the [other] 
litigation demonstrates any possibility of future litigation.”153  Likewise, 
Medicis had not initiated discussions regarding licensing or made any 
statements of infringement; therefore, under the totality of the circumstances, 
declaratory judgment jurisdiction was denied.154
This analysis, however, is a double-edged sword and cuts against 
patent holders who are recklessly aggressive in asserting their patent 
rights.155  In Monolithic Power Systems, Inc. v. 02 Micro International 
Ltd., the court acknowledged that 02 Micro had sued numerous parties 
including MPS for patent infringement.156  From this evidence, the court 
concluded that “such suits indicate an ‘assertion of rights and a willingness 
to pursue litigation’ regarding the patent-in-suit.”157 Therefore, the 
district court concluded that under all the circumstances, including the 
past aggression, there was substantial controversy to satisfy the issuance 
of a declaratory judgment.158
These three cases correctly balance the constitutional and prudential 
considerations for declaratory judgment jurisdiction in patent infringement 
No. C 07-2363 CW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61961 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2007); Prasco, 
L.L.C. v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., No. 1:06cv313, 2007 WL 1974951 (S.D. Ohio July 3, 
2007).
149. BridgeLux, 2007 WL 2022024, at *7. 
150. Id. at *9. 
151. Id.
152. Prasco, 2007 WL 1974951, at *1. 
153. Id. at *1. 
154. Id. at *3. 
155. See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1344–45 
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (noting that related litigation involving the same technology and the 
same parties weighs heavily in favor of establishing a justiciable controversy).  See also 
Cimline, Inc. v. Crafco, Inc., No. 07-3997, 2007 WL 4591957 (D. Minn. Dec. 28, 2007). 
 156. Monolithic Power Sys., Inc. v. 02 Micro Int’l Ltd., No. C 07-2363 CW, 2007 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61961 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2007). 
157. Id. at *9–10. 
158. Id. at *10. 
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cases.  Because all three cases came after the Federal Circuit’s decision 
in SanDisk, they all abide by SanDisk’s precedent with respect to the 
permissible constitutional limits of justiciability.159 However, they 
interpret the SanDisk holding in light of the discretionary prudential 
concerns inherent within declaratory judgment jurisdiction.  These concerns 
illustrate a common underlying rationale—namely, that a declaratory 
judgment defendant’s prior aggressive action towards the declaratory 
judgment plaintiff or other competitors is representative of the defendant’s 
willingness and preparedness to file an infringement suit.160 This 
rationale is optimal for helping to “police the sometimes subtle line 
between cases in which the parties have adverse interests and cases in 
which those adverse interests have ripened into a dispute that may 
properly be deemed a controversy.”161
B.  Immediacy of the Case 
A second circumstantial factor that courts should evaluate to 
determine the appropriateness of a declaratory judgment suit is the 
immediacy of the case.  In MedImmune, the Supreme Court held that the 
case or controversy must be of “sufficient immediacy and reality to 
warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.”162  This Comment 
advocates using prudential circumstances, not limited solely to strict 
constitutional lines, to determine the sufficient immediacy of a case or 
controversy.  The following cases illustrate this approach. 
In Benitec Australia, Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc., the Federal Circuit 
utilized its discretionary power to withhold declaratory judgment jurisdiction 
due to a lack of sufficient immediacy.  As previously discussed, Benitec 
brought a patent infringement action against Nucleonics who counterclaimed 
seeking a declaratory judgment of invalidity and unenforceability.163
Following a Supreme Court decision in another case, Benitec withdrew 
its claims, covenanted not to sue, and filed a motion to dismiss Nucleonics’s 
 159. The Federal Circuit found a justiciable controversy in SanDisk because the 
patentee’s conduct represented a willingness and preparedness to pursue litigation.  
SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1382–83 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
160. See Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 242 F. Supp. 2d 311, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003) (holding that a history of patent litigation between the parties can provide a 
jurisdictional basis). 
 161. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 395 F.3d 1324, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 162. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007). 
 163. Benitec Austl., Ltd., v. Nucleonics, Inc., 495 F.3d 1340, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2007), 
cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2055 (2008). 
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declaratory judgment action.164 Nucleonics argued that although the 
current issue may have been moot because of the covenant not to sue, 
the company had plans to extend its research, and such an extension 
would potentially infringe upon Benitec’s patents.165  The Federal Circuit 
held that Nucleonics failed to show that its discussions regarding expansion 
into additional products met the immediacy and reality requirement of 
MedImmune.166  In his dissenting opinion, Judge Dyk advocated the 
application of a pure constitutional standard and admonished the court’s 
evaluation of discretionary prudential circumstances in this case.167
Judge Dyk wrote: 
While I agree with the majority that the future controversy would not satisfy the 
sufficient immediacy and reality test for the filing of a new suit today, Benitec 
has made no effort to demonstrate that the controversy between the parties will 
not recur. . . .  Benitec has not satisfied its burden to eliminate any future controversy 
concerning infringement of the ‘099 patent.168
The constitutional considerations in this case involved whether a controversy 
still existed, in the sense that Benitec proclaimed a right that conflicted 
with the rights Nucleonics proclaimed it had.  Judge Dyk correctly stated 
that a future controversy of conflicting rights between the two parties 
might have credibly existed. 
However, the majority was correct in using its discretion to withhold 
declaratory judgment jurisdiction over this potential future controversy.  
As explained by Judge Bryson, who wrote the SanDisk concurrence,
“[I]t is unrealistic to suggest that some negotiating patentees intend to 
enforce their patents while some do not, and that the first group is subject to 
declaratory judgment actions while the second is not.”169  Parties in 
negotiation and licensing disputes are always going to have potentially 
adverse economic and legal relations with respect to patent property 
rights.170  The subtle line, however, between adverse legal interests and 
ripened adverse legal interests that have turned into a case or controversy is 
best determined by the discretion of the district court judge.  Additionally, 
this use of discretion is appropriately aligned with public policy because 
it comports with the essential leeway judges need to withhold ruling on 
164. Id. at 1343. 
165. Id. at 1348. 
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1350 (Dyk, J., dissenting). 
168. Id. at 1354 (Dyk, J., dissenting). 
 169. EMC Corp. v. Norand Corp., 89 F.3d 807, 811 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 170. SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 
2007) (Bryson, J., concurring); EMC Corp., 89 F.3d at 811.
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issues that have a strong potential to be resolved out of court before they 
become urgent.171
The district court in Rite Aid Corp. v. Purdue Pharma, L.P. invoked 
similar discretion.  Rite Aid received a letter from Purdue stating its 
concern that Rite Aid was selling infringing generic versions of Purdue’s 
patented OxyContin.172  Rite Aid continued to sell the alleged infringing 
generic version of OxyContin and filed a declaratory judgment against 
Purdue seeking invalidity of Purdue’s OxyContin patents.173 Despite 
constitutional justification for declaratory judgment jurisdiction in this 
dispute, prudential considerations deterred the court from exercising declaratory 
judgment jurisdiction. No actual controversy existed between Purdue 
and Rite Aid because companies similarly situated to Rite Aid settled 
with Purdue, rendering the potential infringement too remote. The court 
explained that “[b]ecause the settlements in Endo, Teva, and Impax have 
removed all unauthorized generic OxyContin from the market and 
released third-party re-sellers from patent-infringement liability, there is 
no ‘actual controversy’ . . . .”174 Rite Aid argued that these settlements 
did not unequivocally bar Purdue from filing a patent infringement suit 
because there existed certain clauses in the settlements, which, if 
satisfied, would expose Rite Aid to patent infringement liability.175  The 
court concluded, however, that because these clauses were too remote in 
time and only a mere possibility, the dispute lacked sufficient immediacy to 
171. See Phillips Plastics Corp. v. Kato Hatsujou Kabushiki Kaisha, 57 F.3d 1051 
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that the patentee’s attempt to conduct license negotiations was 
a commercial activity that generally does not turn into a litigation controversy until 
negotiations have broken down).  Also, district court judges are in the best position to 
determine if the patentee’s negotiation tactics are merely a pretext designed to avoid a 
declaratory judgment suit or if the declaratory judgment suit was a pretext for more 
negotiation leverage.  An example of this can be seen in the Federal Circuit’s EMC case: 
The day after the [declaratory judgment] complaint was filed, EMC’s senior 
intellectual property counsel called Norand’s outside patent counsel and 
explained that the declaratory judgment complaint had been filed as ‘merely a 
defensive step’ . . . .  Under these circumstances, the district court could properly 
view the declaratory judgment complaint as a tactical measure filed in order to 
improve EMC’s posture in the ongoing negotiations—not a purpose that the 
Declaratory Judgment Act was designed to serve. 
EMC Corp., 89 F.3d at 815. 
 172. Rite Aid Corp. v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. 06 Civ. 15304, 2007 WL 2388912, 
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2007). 
173. Id. at *2. 
174. Id. at *4. 
175. Id. at *4. 
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constitute an actual controversy.176  This decision conveys an important 
underlying message: Even if a genuine dispute exists, as here regarding 
the rights to sell generic OxyContin, the court will favor negotiation and 
settlement over the admission of declaratory judgment jurisdiction. 
C.  Patent Holder’s Willingness to Negotiate Outside of Court 
This leads to the third factor judges should consider when evaluating 
declaratory judgment jurisdiction—the parties’ willingness to negotiate 
and settle.  Prior to 2007, the Federal Circuit generally deemed the 
patent holder’s willingness to engage in negotiation as negating any 
reasonable apprehension of suit, even in the absence of a covenant not to 
sue.177  Likewise, the Federal Circuit also found ongoing negotiations to 
lessen the need for judicial relief.178 Encouraging negotiation over 
judicial remedies conforms with public policy because negotiations are 
more practical and commercially efficient.179  Additionally, negotiations 
promote the judicial efficiency that Congress sought in the Declaratory 
176. Id. at *5. The Federal Circuit’s recent decision in CAT Tech L.L.C. v. 
Tubemaster, Inc., 528 F.3d 871 (Fed. Cir. 2008), reinforces the soundness of this 
judgment.  In this case, the court stressed the dispositive nature that immediacy of a case 
has upon declaratory judgment jurisdiction.  Id. at 880.  The court explained, “the greater 
the length of time before potentially infringing activity is expected to occur, ‘the more 
likely the case lacks the requisite immediacy.’”  Id. at 881. 
 177. Shell Oil Co. v. Amoco Corp., 970 F.2d 885, 889 (Fed. Cir. 1992).  The court 
explained: 
Amoco took no action against Shell; it made no assertive contact concerning the 
patent; it issued no threats.  Shell, in an exercise of prudent good business 
citizenship, approached Amoco, stating that it intended to embark on a course of 
conduct, recognizing, but disagreeing, that Amoco’s patent might be considered 
to dominate its work.  Rather than wait to be caught in a possibly infringing posture, it 
identified its proposed activity to Amoco and sought either confirmation of its 
views or a license.  Such conduct is praiseworthy. 
Id.  Prior to SanDisk, federal courts have, at a minimum, considered settlement negotiations a 
relevant, but not dispositive, factor in determining declaratory judgment jurisdiction.  See 
Elec. for Imaging, Inc. v. Coyle, 394 F.3d 1341, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also 
Genender Intern, Inc. v. Skagen Designs, Ltd., No. 07 C 5993, 2008 WL 2521894, at *3 
(N.D. Ill. April 14, 2008) (providing a brief overview of current case law regarding the 
effect of settlement negotiations on declaratory judgment jurisdiction). 
 178. The Federal Circuit noted that: 
While a court may conclude that ongoing negotiations do not negate the 
presence of a controversy for jurisdictional purposes, the court may nonetheless 
find, in deciding whether to hear the declaratory judgment action, that the need 
for judicial relief is not as compelling as in cases in which there is no real 
prospect of non-judicial resolution of the dispute. 
EMC Corp. v. Norand Corp., 89 F.3d 807, 814 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 179. “[T]he practical effect of denying access to the courts is the concern of the 
Declaratory Judgment Act . . . .  When there are proposed or ongoing license negotiations, a 
litigation controversy normally does not arise until the negotiations have broken down.”  
Phillips Plastics Corp. v. Kato Hatsujou Kabushiki Kaisha, 57 F.3d 1051, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 
1995).
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Judgment Act.180  Unfortunately, contrary to the goals in the Declaratory 
Judgment Act, in Sony Electronics, Inc. v. Guardian Media Technologies, 
Ltd., the Federal Circuit directly overruled a district court’s declaratory 
judgment dismissal that was grounded in prudential concerns.181  The 
district court had properly considered the suit a mere intimidation tactic 
by the declaratory judgment plaintiff to gain leverage in licensing 
negotiations.182  Citing insufficient evidence, the Federal Circuit did not 
directly hold that this type of discretionary dismissal is never allowed.183
Since SanDisk, there has been only one federal court holding denying 
declaratory judgment jurisdiction based upon a plaintiff’s shrewd litigation 
tactics.184  In Innovative Therapies, Inc. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc.,185 the 
district judge utilized his discretion to deny declaratory judgment jurisdiction 
despite an alleged affirmative act that likely created an Article III case or 
controversy as understood under the MedImmune standard.186  The 
district judge reasoned that the declaratory judgment plaintiff’s sly pre-
litigation behavior and unwillingness to “make its concerns a matter of 
record pre-suit” spoiled the objectives behind the Declaratory Judgment 
Act.187  The use of discretion in this case exemplifies, albeit in a narrow 
paradigm, the appropriate reasoning process judges should follow when 
deciding whether to use their discretion to deny declaratory judgment 
jurisdiction.
In sum, this Comment proposes a new test that encourages judges to 
review declaratory judgment jurisdiction in patent cases more strictly, by 
 180. Russell B. Hill, Should Anticipation Kill Application of the Declaratory 
Judgment Act?, 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 239, 255 (2004).
If a court dismisses a declaratory action merely because an affirmative lawsuit 
is subsequently filed, the court negates the purpose of the Declaratory 
Judgment Act.  . . .  In addition, unbridled application of the anticipatory lawsuit 
exception gives unfair leverage to the putative plaintiff in negotiations, allowing the 
plaintiff to keep a cloud over the defendant’s business and future plans. 
Id.
 181. Sony Elecs., Inc. v. Guardian Media Techs., Ltd., 497 F.3d 1271, 1281 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007). 
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1289. 
 184. The Author performed the following Westlaw search on July 6, 2008:
negotiate! and dismiss /s declaratory judgment and patent and da(aft 12/31/2006).
 185. Innovative Therapies, Inc. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 07-589-SLR/LPS, 2008 
WL 4809104 (D. Del. Nov 5, 2008). 
186. Id. at *2. 
187. Id.  The declaratory judgment plaintiff’s sly behavior includes “initiating 
telephone conversations to employees of the patentee who were not in decision-making 
positions and who were not informed of the real purpose behind the conversations.”  Id.
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evaluating three major prudential considerations.  First, judges should 
evaluate the declaratory judgment defendant’s economic function and 
position.  If the declaratory judgment defendant is a quiescent patent 
holder, then judges should be less willing to grant a declaratory judgment 
against such defendants.  Second, judges should continue to require that 
a case or controversy be of sufficient immediacy and reality.  Judges 
should not follow Judge Dyk’s overly broad interpretation of a possible 
future controversy, but instead should analyze only the controversies set 
forth in the facts alleged.  If a controversy is too far and distant, then 
judges should deny declaratory judgment jurisdiction. Third, judges 
should be more sympathetic to declaratory judgment defendants who 
are actively willing to negotiate. If negotiations are in progress and a 
declaratory judgment is filed in an effort to gain more negotiating leverage, 
then judges should use their discretionary power to deny jurisdiction. 
VI. CONCLUSION
When determining declaratory judgment jurisdiction, district court 
judges should exercise their discretion by considering three factors: the 
patent holder’s economic function and stance, the immediacy of the case, 
and the patent holder’s willingness to negotiate.  These three factors would 
best serve the public policy espoused in the Declaratory Judgment Act 
by restoring the balance that the MedImmune and SanDisk decisions 
upset between patent holders and their potential licensees.  As a result, 
parties would be encouraged to negotiate a licensing dispute out of court, 
and declaratory judgment jurisdiction would be limited to the patent 
cases it was originally intended to resolve.  In other words, the pink elephant 
would disappear, and opposing parties would return to the negotiation 
table seeing eye to eye. 
